This article examines the efficacy of a "defense in participations" policy consisting of competitors acquiring cross equity participations within the same industry to prevent hostile takeovers. This defense in participations strategy provides disincentive for raiders as partial ownerships increase market power of competitors and then reinforce the "outsider effect". Also, we find conditions for a general result which states that takeovers are less profitable in an industry with participations rather than in an industry without any capital links. We provide information to regulators about the positive social impact of cross participations in the context of mergers, and expose an economic dilemma between a "laisser-faire" and an interventionist approach. 
This article examines the efficacy of a "defense in participations" policy consisting of competitors acquiring cross equity participations within the same industry to prevent hostile takeovers. This defense in participations strategy provides disincentive for raiders as partial ownerships increase market power of competitors and then reinforce the "outsider effect". Also, we find conditions for a general result which states that takeovers are less profitable in an industry with participations rather than in an industry without any capital links. We provide information to regulators about the positive social impact of cross participations in the context of mergers, and expose an economic dilemma between a "laisser-faire" and an interventionist approach. A hostile takeover consists of buying shares of another corporation for the purpose of taking control of its management and of receiving its dividends. The raider (the acquiring firm) announces its desire to buy back targeted company's shares at a premium. The level of the premium is set to encourage shareholders to sell their stake and also partially reflects potential synergies 1 of the merger. According to Manne (1965) and Jensen (1986) , the primary synergies 1 The takeover by Hewlett-Packard of Autonomy is an example of an excessive premium paid by the acquirer based on miscalculated synergies and goodwill value. arise mostly from a change in the management because poorly controlled companies are easy targets for raiders. Further, a substantial premium can prevent other competitors entering a bid race for the acquisition of the firm. Achieving better results than competitors is the best defense against raiders, but a hostile takeover does not always constitute a credible threat for underperforming managers. Indeed, Grossman & Hart (1980) state that in the case of a takeover both managers and shareholders will be harmed; however this idea is criticized by Deman (1994) . Numerous other strategies against hostile buyouts have been imagined and implemented such as: Pac-Man 2 , Shark Repellents, Crown Jewels, Poison Pills, or antitakeover provisions (ATPs). All these strategies do not directly modify the capital structure of the target. However, in the context of buyouts the question of capital appears to be crucial.
Most of the time, a takeover is preceded by a small acquisition of capital, a toehold which proves beneficial to take control of the firm because it increases the amount necessary for competitors to win the battle. Bulow et al. (1999) thus find that competitors have no incentive to overbid the toehold acquirer, because of the winner's curse effect 3 . The literature related to agency costs (Fama, 1980; Easterbrook, 1984) , or to antitakeover amendments (DeAngelo & Rice, 1983; Garell & Poulsen, 1987) , and to toeholds (Choi, 1991; Betton et al., 2009 ) has flourished. However fundamental questions on takeover incentives still remain. For example, Inderst & Wey (2004) examine the profitability of takeovers in Bertrand and in Cournot competing industries, where incentives increase along with substitutability and independency of goods respectively. To achieve diversification, the cross participations can be acquired in the capital of rivals operating in the same or in different economic regions, into suppliers and clients firms, or unrelated businesses. Partial ownerships can also be also used to reinforce market power by linking profit objectives of firms at the horizontal level (Perotti, 1992; Reitman, 1994) , in a vertical relationship (Greenlee & Raskovich, 2006) , or in a mixed framework (Serbera, 2010) . The theoretical (see e.g. Malueg, 1992; O'brien & Salop, 2000) and applied (see e.g. Reiffen, 1998) literature on partial ownerships is extensive but little exists on equity participations strategies as a defense to hostile takeovers. An historic example of a defensive strategy appeared during the first step of privatization of French State-owned companies (such as Saint-Gobain, Paribas, Société Générale) starting in 1986: the "noyaux-durs" (or literally hard cores in English).
There are several examples of "defense in participations" policies equivalent across the world: -The "Keiretsu", which constitute a complex network of equity participations arranged by a bank and linking corporations in Japan 4 were widely studied in empirical literature (Flath, 1990; Brown & Fung, 2009 ). -The "Deutschland AG" (Franks & Mayer, 1998; Lantenois, 2011) which uses capital arrangements to align the interests of the financial and industrial companies with those of the employees whilst reducing the number of supervisory boards.
-The "golden shares 5 " policy in the United Kingdom implemented during the Thatcher privatization era (see Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998) . The British government started acquiring a F o r P e e r R e v i e w 3 small percentage of (preferred) shares of strategic companies such as Rolls-Royces, allowing it to nominate board's members and apply a veto's power in certain circumstances.
All these "defenses in participations" consist of creating a core of shareholders through over-the-counter shares acquisitions following advices from investment banks. More precisely, freshly privatized companies were acquiring shares of capital in each other in order to constitute a stable pool of stakeholders able to prevent any hostile takeover. The connection between BNP Paribas and AXA acquiring around 5% of each other at the time 6 in France, and Deutsche Bank with an acquisition of 4.1% in Allianz in Germany, were famous examples of "golden shares". Since the end of privatizations in western countries, these strategies are no longer imposed, but existing shares still give governments a veto on major decisions such as takeovers. For example in 2012, BAE's merger with EADS (now Airbus) was blocked by the UK government which exercised its right to enforce the golden share rule. The particular case of the "noyaux-durs" policy has been criticized afterwards by Goldstein (1996) . He notes firstly, the make-up of the core of shareholders was mostly based on financial considerations and missed the opportunity of creating synergies following the participations arrangement. Secondly, the process of acquisition of partial ownerships lacked transparency. As a consequence of its lack of transparency, the price paid by the State for the shares did not include the control premium and was below the market price paid by private investors.
More generally, despite criticisms of the opacity of the design and the implementation of these governmental policies, the use of partial horizontal ownerships (PHO) as a defense against hostile takeovers raises many questions. In the context of mergers' profitability and incentives, when silent participations are possible we can cite Foros et al. (2011) . They assert that the accrued profitability resulting from a partial (but controlling) ownership arrangement is greater than after a full merger. This greater profitability comes from increased barriers to entry after the participations arrangement becomes publicly observable. In the case of a majority ownership, the two firms are controlled by the same managers. However, in this article, we study the impact of a defense in participations on takeover incentives in an industry where firms can acquire partial non-controlling (also called silent 7 or passive) and reciprocal shares (cross participations) in the capital of competitors. In our model with silent ownerships, each management remains in place and decides upon its own production despite internalizing rival's profit up to its participation level. By using passive participations instead of controlling ones, we are thus able to differentiate between the effect of participations and that of mergers. More precisely, this article highlights the influence of cross participations on takeover incentives by determining their profitability in a Cournot oligopoly model with n firms producing differentiated goods.
Our model finds a simple solution where PHO constitute an effective defense against hostile takeovers by reducing incentives to raid protected firms inside the industry. As a more general result, we show that when comparing two different industries, a hostile buyout is less likely in an industry where companies use the defense in participations strategy rather than in an industry without any capital links between the firms. We refine the result on the efficiency of the defense in participations relatively to the number of competing firms, and we obtain the defense 6 Ended in 2010 7 Silent ownerships are a common practice between competing firms. In the case of listed firms all regulatory ownerships thresholds are regularly reported to financial markets regulatory agencies. The type of shares determines associated voting rights. As long as the ownership remains minority participation (below 50%) the only impact on other firm managers' decisions is the co-integration of profits. As a consequence, this assumption rules out decisions such as stopping activity or shutting down the partially acquired firm. In this paper we only consider participations through class B shares (giving a claim on capital and no voting rights); this allows us to call them silent. is more powerful in a less concentrated industry. In this case, a weaker market power leads to reduction of expected profits following a merger. The intuitive explanation of the efficiency of this defense strategy in PHO mainly arises from an increased "outsider effect 8 " of merger (see Salant et al., 1983) brought by the cross participations.
This study adds an innovative defense strategy against hostile takeovers to already existing ones, and opens the field for regulation in various ways. In a conservative approach this defense is effective against hostile buyouts over strategic sectors (weapons, nuclear, communications) from foreign competitors, but in a more liberal one it raises barriers against the self-regulation of the market (even if it leads to less competition).
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Model and Set-Up participations choice in this model. Each firm behaves as an owner-managed 9 entity. Firms individually produce quantity of a substitutable good. The magnitude of substitutability depends on the substitutability parameter γ, γ ∈ ]0;1[.We only consider substitutable goods in order 10 to study the impact of participations and takeovers in a quantity competing oligopoly. For simplicity we assume that marginal costs of production, transformation and retail are constant. We suppose that the demand curve is linear:
∈ I. Profit maximization considers operative profit (revenues minus costs), plus the share α in the capital of a rival (for linked firms only). The following figure illustrates the organization of the industry:
Fig. 1 The defense in participations in an oligopoly
We consider two distinct situations in this model. The first stage of the model discussed in Section 3 before any buyout. The second stage of the model discussed in Section 3.2.1-3.2.2 models the effects of the takeover. The effects of the takeover upon an unprotected firm (Section 3.2.1) and protected firms (Section 3.2.2) are discussed separately. By computing equilibrium profits we are able to compare pre and post-takeover profits and then derive firms' incentives to merge depending on their participations links α.
Solutions

Pre-Takeover
We begin the resolution of the model by the first stage, before any buyout. Before a hypothetical buyout, the industry is composed of n firms competing in quantities; each company behaves individually with the objective of maximizing its profit. Within the n firms only Firms 1-2 internalize profits of each other relative to the cross participation α. In the following, we 
Then, the profit of a firm without equity participations and representative of the majority of the industry can be calculated as
Solving simultaneously we obtain equilibrium quantities noted with a * . We thus observe that quantities q 1 * and q 2 * set by linked firms (with participation α) are inferior to quantities q i * set by other firms without PHO: q 1 * = q 2 * < q i * , the inequality holds for γ ∈ ]0;1[. This expected result comes from partial internalization of cross profits. The more α increases, the more Firms 1 and 2 internalize profits of each other and cut their output. In turn, Firms 1-2 are incentivized to tacitly collude and this softens competition. But, in reaction to Firms 1-2 reduction in output, rival firms increase their own production and replace the lost quantities at the higher price. In the end, we obtain the traditional result of the "outsider effect" (see Salant et al., 1983) : the one outside the participations benefit from the tacit collusion by capturing the additional revenue. Replacing equilibrium quantities found (1), (2) and (3) we thus obtain equilibrium profits. As the quantities from outsiders exceed insiders' ones, the same is true for profits 11 :
. In the following subsection, we study equilibrium profits of all firms in the industry after a takeover has happened.
Post-Takeover
In our study the raid is conducted by a firm outside 12 of the defense in participations in order to specifically test the solidity of this strategy of defense. We distinguish two cases for the buyout: -Firstly, toward an unprotected (non-linked) firm -Secondly, toward a protected firm (with participations).
Takeover of an Unprotected Firm
We then begin with Firm i taking over Firm j, both are unprotected. We note M π the expression 11 Please refer to the Appendix for the expression of equilibrium profits relevant to incentives calculations in Section 4. 12 As our research places in the context of a defensive economic policy, the consequences of a protected firm raiding a competitor are left for further research on the subject. 
Given the sum of these two concave 13 profit functions is a concave function, we are able to determine the equilibrium output of the merged firm. Moreover, a symmetrical equilibrium can exist because reaction functions ,.) ( j iand ,.) ( i jare symmetrical, and by equalizing q i and q j we obtain a unique solution of post-merger quantity marked with an M : q M . The profit expression of the other firms does not move, but now Firms i and j have to be separated from other unprotected firms. We then introduce the notation q l for quantities of unprotected outsiders. We first derive the profit expressions of the two protected firms:
These profit expressions being symmetrical ensures that equilibrium quantities will be symmetrical too. The profit expression for Firm k, unprotected and out of the merger, is derived as follows:
Solving simultaneously for quantities, we obtain the expression of equilibrium quantities noted with a ** . By ranking these quantities we find:
. Here also we obtain that the more the profits are integrated (partially with participations or totally for the buyout), the more the reduction of joint output is important. In the case of the merged firms, the output's decision is commonly set but each firm produces individually 14 . We expect that the profits will follow the same ranking: bigger profits for the unprotected firms and out of the buyout, then the defended firms and then merged firms. By replacing equilibrium quantities found in (5), (6), and (7) we obtain equilibrium profits. The ranking 15 is expressed as follows:
for any positive value of the parameters n, c, or γ. This comparison thus 13 Please refer to the Appendix for the proof of concavity of the firms' individual profit functions. 14 The two firms (having symmetrical profit functions) choose the same individual output. 15 Please note that in this ranking we consider π M ** /2 as the merged entity includes the sum of the two firms' profits with double q M quantities. confirms the role of the "outsider effect" on profitability. This result appears as a preview for the study of buyout incentives in Section 4. In the following, we study the second case of a takeover equilibrium with one of the two protected firms being the target.
Takeover of a Protected Firm
We consider here that Firm i launches a raid on Firm 1, the following expression marked with a ′ M is a sum of: Firm 1's profit plus the portion α of profit held in Firm 2 plus the whole profit of the raider (Firm i): 
We derive reaction functions for Firms 2 and j, and then by solving simultaneously the four reactions functions we obtain equilibrium output quantities noted with a *** . We then derive a ranking:
which is a consequence (once again) of the outsider's effect. More explicitly, profit internalizing firms tacitly collude and reduce their output relative to the magnitude of their holdings. Firm j 16 which is not internalizing any rival's profit set the greater quantity of output at equilibrium for a uniform price and thus generates the greater individual profit. We also find a similar ranking for profits and quantities with 2 2 * * * ′ * * * * * * > > M j π π π . These differences arise from the magnitude of profit internalization and are a consequence of the "outsider effect". So far, we have computed equilibrium profits before the takeover, then in the case of raids on a protected and on an unprotected firm. In the following section we study firms' incentives for a takeover in a comparative static framework.
Incentives
16 Firm j is representative of the n-3 firms outside of participation arrangements and of the takeover. In this section we consider two cases: 1-When the raid is on an unprotected firm (Section 4.1).
2-When the raid is on a protected firm linked by participations (Section 4.2).
We first define and compute the insider's and outsider's "impact" of a takeover, and then we define and compute the takeover incentives in each case using the two impacts previously calculated.
Incentives to Raid an Unprotected Firm
We use here comparative static to obtain the impact on a raider of triggering a hostile takeover of an unprotected firm. Insider's impact is defined as the comparison between individual profits before the acquisition and joint profits 17 of the raider after acquisition. 
The sign of equation (11) is ambiguous and depends on the value of parameters of the model. After a study of the difference in equilibrium profits (the impact M I ), the most crucial factor is the value 18 of the substitutability parameter γ. M I is positive for low values of γ. The profitability of the raid (on an unprotected firm) has to be positive to study the effects of the defense in participations, we thus pose it as a condition for the rest of the study. We then investigate merger profitability for low values of γ. Further, an increase in market power with higher values of PHO α and lower number n of firms increases merger's profitability. Indeed, a buyout in a more concentrated industry 19 will always be more beneficial for the raider due to a greater increase in market power. Finally, it is straightforward to derive that the cost parameter c decreases profitability of a merger for all positive values.
After the study of takeover impact on the insiders, we now study the outsider's impact on an unprotected outsider's firm in order to determine final incentives to merge (the comparison of the respective impacts). Outsider's impact out I represents the outsider's profitability of staying outside a raid on an unprotected firm within the industry. It is defined as the comparison between individual profits of a non-raider firm before the acquisition and its individual profits after acquisition. It is computed in a similar manner to equation (11), by subtracting the pre-takeover value of an unprotected outsider profits ( ) * * = i k π π from the value of an unprotected outsider post-takeover profit ) ( * * k π :
17 The merged firm profit includes the sum of the two previous individual profits. 18 All parameter solutions are graphically presented in the proofs in the Appendix. 19 Reducing the number of firms from 4 to 3 leads to a bigger increase in concentration than a reduction from 100 to 99 (25% versus 1% respectively). This expression has a positive sign for all (positive) values of the model parameters, meaning that outsider firms are always better off when there is a takeover in the industry. This phenomenon is due to the "outsider effect" which is reinforced when market power in the industry is stronger (i.e. for greater values of α and lower values of n).
Finally, we define incentives which trigger a takeover. These incentives are determined by subtracting the impact of staying out of a takeover from the impact of launching a raid:
. We obtain that 0
for all (positive) values of the model parameters. Further, this negative incentive is reinforced when market power in the industry is stronger (i.e. for greater values of α and lower values of n). We conclude that in an industry where cross participations are possible it is always more profitable for a company to stay outside of an acquisition on an unprotected firm rather than to trigger a takeover. This result is consistent with the results of the "outsider effect" of mergers.
Incentives to raid a Protected Firm
Using the same process as in Section 4.1, we note 
The sign of equation (13) is ambiguous, and as in the previous case it depends on the values of the parameter γ in particular. For low values of γ this expression is negative (whereas M I is positive). Further, this negative impact is reinforced when market power in the industry is stronger (i.e. for greater values of α and lower values of n). The cost parameter c has a negative influence on profitability.
The impact on outsiders' profits in this case is noted In this case of a raid on a protected firm, outsiders' profit impact is negative for low values of γ, but greater than ′ M I . Further, this negative impact is reinforced when market power in the industry is stronger (i.e. for greater values of α and lower values of n). The cost parameter c has a negative influence on profitability.
In this case of a raid on a protected firm, we use the same method to obtain the choice's incentives to raid a rival firm or not. They are derived by subtracting outsider's impact from insider's impact:
for low values of parameter γ. Further, F o r P e e r R e v i e w 11 this negative incentive is reinforced when market power in the industry is stronger. The cost parameter c has a negative influence on profitability. Here also, the increase in profits for outsiders is more important. This leads us to conclude that in an industry where cross participations are possible it is always more profitable for a company to stay outside of an acquisition of a protected firm rather than to trigger it. This result is consistent with the "outsider effect" result of mergers.
In Section 4, we determined a firm's incentives to raid a protected or an unprotected rival in accordance with "the outsider effect" result of mergers. In Section 5.1, we test the efficacy of the defense in participations by comparing the values of the merger impacts M I and M I
' .
Further, we expand the study area in Section 5.2 by comparing the impact of a takeover in a protected industry (with linked firms) with the impact of a takeover in an oligopoly industry where there are no PHO (a benchmark).
Results and Propositions
In this section, we demonstrate the efficiency of the defense in participations by comparing takeover incentives on a protected firm versus those on an unprotected firm in a protected industry (with firms acquiring participations). Further we expand the study tocompare takeovers in a protected versus an unprotected industry (the benchmark).
Within an Industry with Participations
We compare the insider's impact on an unprotected is positive, and these incentives (within the industry) are reinforced by market power. This leads to a simple conclusion: takeover incentives on an unprotected firm are higher than those on a protected firm in a protected industry. The following proposition states this result:
Proposition 1: The holding of cross participations in the capital of a competitor is an efficient defense against a hostile takeover. This proposition is explained by the value of the takeover impact. Since it is lower on an protected firm due to an increased "outsider effect", a rational raider will prefer to raid an unprotected target.
Within an Industry without Participations
As a first step, we use an insider's impact in a common Cournot oligopoly benchmark to expand our study and result in a wider framework. The difference lies in the absence of participations in this case. This insider impact follows the same computation method used previously, i.e. comparing the sum of profits pre and post takeover. We note ′′ M I the insider's impact in a common (no participations) industry competing in quantities: the benchmark. The sign of this expression is ambiguous, like in the participations' framework, and strongly depends on the value of the substitutability parameter γ. Here also, the takeover impact can still be positive for low 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 values of γ, and an increase in market power with a smaller number of firms (no participations α in this case) makes the takeover more profitable.
Comparison among Industries
As a second step, we now compare the insider's impact is ambiguous, it is negative for low values of γ when market power is strong enough, and especially when the number of firms is big enough. This comparison shows that takeover incentives (among industries) are greater when there is no defense in participations. We then can deduce that ) (
. This result highlights that a takeover is less profitable in an industry with participations as the incentives to merge are lower. We state this result in the following proposition: This proposition is explained by the value of the (unprotected) takeover impact in an industry where two of the firms are defended with participations. Since it is lower due to an increased "outsider effect", a rational raider will prefer to raid a target in an industry without a defense in participations.
Regulation
In contrast to literature results on the anticompetitive role of horizontal participations (Reitman, 1994; Gilo et al., 2006 ) alone or as a toehold before a full takeover (Jovanovic & Wey, 2014) , our analysis exposes the social benefits of PHO in our model. Indeed, the fact that participations constitute hurdles to hostile takeovers leads in the end to a less concentrated industry, even if in the beginning participations have lessened competition. These results have an implication in terms of regulation as they highlight the competitive role of cross horizontal participations.
The defense in participations in Europe with the "golden shares", "Deutschland AG" or "noyaux-durs" defers to the regulation of the European Commission and to the ruling the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the case of a dispute. Special rights of the Union's members on private undertakings are discussed and examined to determine whether or not this falls within the ambit of the free movement of capital and payments. Lustig & Weil (2002) relate three ECJ rulings on participations and their link with corporate governance. In the case of Belgium, the ECJ granted the decision of giving notice to the responsible ministry of any changes in participations for the "Société Nationale de Transport par Canalisation" as well as the "Société de Distribution du Gaz SA" relating to a change in network facilities. In the case of France, the ECJ rejected the use of "golden shares" to secure approval of the Ministry of Economic Affairs when ceilings 21 in participations were crossed for the "Société Nationale Elf-Aquitaine". Finally in the case of Portugal, the ECJ denied the justification of Portugal to use its participations to block 20 Because we already shown that takeover incentives are greater on an unprotected firm than on a protected one. 21 10%, 20%, or 30%. foreign share acquisitions in privatised companies. In these three cases the European Commission attacked the countries' decision to protect privatised companies using a defense in participations on the basis of an infringement of the "laisser-faire" of the market (free movement of capital and payments).
Our paper explores mathematically the competition approach on this topic, and our theoretical results on the potential competitive role of PHO send a contrarian signal to the regulation agencies and the courts. We argue that the regulators and governments could take into account the findings introduced by this theoretical research to expand their comprehension of the defense in participations. Though the defense in participations could be counter to the free movement of capital on markets, it should be allowed under specific countries' strategic circumstances (e.g. BAE-EADS merger) and also to counter the increase of concentration and market power in a particular industry.
Conclusion
In this article, we study takeover incentives in a Cournot oligopoly model with two firms linked by cross participations following an anti-takeover defense strategy. We show that within an industry, PHO reduce incentives of competing firms to raid a protected firm by decreasing takeover profitability. We thus demonstrate that the defense in participations is meaningful and efficient to block hostile takeovers, and also has a competitive aspect. This competitive aspect is proven by the comparison of takeover incentives between two industries, one with the defense in participations and a benchmark without participations. As the full integration of a rival's profits (buyout) is more harmful in terms of competition than partial ownerships, we suppose that authorizing PHO could thus have social benefits. Theoretical literature (see e.g. Malueg, 1992; O'brien & Salop, 2000) and applied work (see e.g. Perotti, 1992; Reiffen, 1998) investigate participations but do not link them with takeover incentives. Further, numerous articles highlight the role and functioning of different forms of golden shares across several countries: (Flath, 1990; Brown & Fung, 2009 ) on Keiretsu, Franks & Mayer (1998) and Lantenois (2011) on Deutschland AG, Yergin & Stanislaw (1998) on UK golden shares, and Goldstein (1996) for French "noyaux-durs". In addition, Foros et al. (2011) derive the profitability of a partial (but controlling) ownership. The role of our article is to expose a theoretical study of the efficacy of the golden shares as a defense in participations in the context of mergers.
To complement this article, a reverse study of the consequences of cross participations on protected firms' incentives to raid competitors could be addressed in further research; this protection could be used in this case to "attack" competitors. This should prove decisive in the analysis of the influence of PHO on market concentration and on economic welfare. We believe that this paper sheds new light on the current analysis of competition in the case of a defense in participations. It also raises questions in the case of an "attack" and thus gives room for additional investigations. Therefore this study of equity strategies, against or supporting a buyout, could make policy makers change the current regulatory monitoring process and could intensify applied research on the subject. 
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